Replication Data for: Military Defection During Localized Protests: The Case of Tataouine

In May 2017, the Tunisian military allowed protesters to storm and shut down an oil valve in Tataouine, in contravention of a direct order from President Essebsi to defend the production site. While scholars have recently examined military defection during mass uprisings, these protests were small and localized. Why did the military disobey President Essebsi in Tataouine? Drawing upon a survey of military officers conducted six months prior to the defection, I show that the military's composition and corporate interests, rather than its professionalism, likely prompted its defection. The majority of the military hails from impoverished regions in Tunisia's neglected interior and identifies with the demands of protesters in these regions. The military also saw the curtailment of its material and political interests in early 2017, giving it little incentive to repress protesters on the regime's behalf. Methodologically, this study provides some of the first survey data of military officers’ attitudes toward defection.

2017年5月，突尼斯军方允许抗议者冲击并关停了塔塔乌因地区的一处石油阀门，此举违反了总统埃塞卜西下达的保卫该生产设施的直接命令。尽管近期有学者针对大规模起义期间的军方叛逃行为展开了研究，但此次抗议活动规模较小且具有地域局限性。那么，突尼斯军方为何会在塔塔乌因地区违抗埃塞卜西总统的命令？本研究借助叛逃事件发生六个月前开展的军方军官调查问卷，证实军方的人员构成与集体利益，而非其职业素养，更可能是促使其叛逃的动因。绝大多数军方人员来自突尼斯被长期忽视的内陆贫困地区，与当地抗议者的诉求存在身份认同。此外，军方在2017年初遭遇了自身物质与政治利益的缩减，这使其几乎没有动力为政权镇压抗议者。从方法论层面而言，本研究提供了首批针对军方军官叛逃态度的调查数据。