Replication data for: Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets

We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks' market power can mitigate these negative effects.

本研究探讨了小企业信贷额度市场中的信息不对称与不完全竞争的影响。依托意大利的企业-银行匹配数据集，我们构建并估计了涵盖信贷需求、贷款使用、信贷定价与企业违约行为的结构化模型。研究发现了逆向选择的相关证据：信贷需求的未观测决定因素与企业违约之间存在正向相关关系。反事实实验结果显示，尽管逆向选择程度的提升会推高信贷定价、推高平均违约率并减少信贷供给，但银行的市场势力能够有效缓解这些负面效应。