Data for: Structural versus behavioral remedies in the deregulation of electricity markets: An experimental investigation motivated by policy concerns

Abstract of associated article: We experimentally study the effects of introducing a forward market and of increasing the number of competitors in a quantity-setting market under strictly convex production costs. Our key interest is to better understand which of these two remedies is more effective at enhancing competition. Allaz and Vila (1993) theorized that forward markets can have a pro-competitive effect under linear production costs. Le Coq and Orzen (2006) and Brandts et al. (2008) investigated this and related issues experimentally. All three experiments (including ours) support the prediction by Allaz and Vila (1993) that introducing a forward market does indeed intensify competition. The results of the present study, however, differ from previous experimental results in that we find the forward market to be the more effective remedy. Brandts et al. (2008) increase the number of competitors by entry, which thus increases the aggregate stock of production assets and makes output cheaper. In contrast, we increase the number of competitors by divestiture, which leaves the aggregate stock of production assets constant. Our results address an important policy issue and provide tentative evidence on the competition-enhancing effect of forward markets, which can be considered a behavioral remedy.

关联研究论文摘要：本研究通过实验，探究了在生产成本严格凸性的产量竞争市场中，引入远期市场与增加竞争者数量所产生的效应。我们的核心研究目标在于厘清这两种竞争增强举措中，何者的效果更为显著。Allaz与Vila（1993）曾提出理论假说，认为在线性生产成本条件下，远期市场能够发挥促竞争效应。Le Coq与Orzen（2006）、Brandts等人（2008）曾针对该问题及相关议题开展实验研究。包括本实验在内的三项实验均验证了Allaz和Vila（1993）的预测：引入远期市场确实会加剧市场竞争程度。但本研究的实验结果与既往研究存在差异：我们发现远期市场是效果更优的竞争增强手段。Brandts等人（2008）通过新企业进入的方式增加竞争者数量，此举会提升生产资产总存量，进而降低单位产出成本。与之形成对照的是，本研究通过资产剥离的方式增加竞争者数量，该操作不会改变生产资产总存量。本研究结果回应了一项重要的政策议题，并为远期市场作为一种行为性竞争补救手段的促竞争效应提供了初步实证依据。