Replication Data for: The Economic Consequences of Banking Crises: The Role of Central Banks and Optimal Independence

A large literature establishes the benefits of central bank independence, yet very few have shown directly negative economic consequences. I argue that, rather than improving economic outcomes, independent central banks are myopically focused on inflation and this leads to tepid responsiveness to banking instability. I show that banking crises produce larger unemployment shocks, and credit and stock market contractions when the level of central bank independence is high. Further, I show that these significant economic costs can be mitigated by abandoning the inflation-centric policy mandates predominantly considered necessary. When the bank has high technical and political independence, banks’ whose policy mandate does not rigidly prioritize inflation produce significantly better outcomes during banking crises. At the same time, I show that this configuration does not produce higher inflation, suggesting it achieves a more flexible design without incurring significant costs.

已有大量文献论证了中央银行独立性（central bank independence）的益处，但鲜有研究直接证实其会带来负面经济后果。本文主张，独立央行非但未能改善经济表现，反而因短视地聚焦于通胀目标，导致其对银行体系不稳定的响应力度疲软乏力。本文研究发现，当中央银行独立性程度较高时，银行业危机引发的失业冲击、信贷与股市收缩幅度均更为显著。进一步研究表明，摒弃主流认知中不可或缺的、以通胀为核心的政策目标设定，可有效缓解此类显著的经济成本。当央行具备较高的技术与政治独立性时，那些未将通胀作为刚性优先政策目标的央行，在应对银行业危机时可取得显著更优的经济表现。与此同时，研究还表明这种政策框架并不会推高通胀水平，这意味着该设计实现了更具灵活性的政策架构，且未带来显著的额外成本。