Data Availability for International Journal of Logistics Research and Application

Suppose a manufacturing and logistics industry linkage system is composed of logistics outsourcing enterprise groups and logistics contracting enterprise groups in the market. The cooperation between the two parties is established on the principal-agent relationship to obtain the excess profits of the linkage. Due to the information asymmetry, the logistics contracting company fully understands its service capabilities, service costs, and other private information, whereas the logistics outsourcing company can only observe the after-event results and cannot accurately understand the real information of the agent. Logistics contracting companies are willing to share information and reduce logistics risk costs to increase the benefits of linkage cooperation. However, considering the serious homogeneity of services in the logistics outsourcing market, fierce market competition, and low service profits, some logistics contracting companies will choose to speculate instead of sharing their real information, and obtain more cooperation opportunities and seek more speculative gains by overstating their logistics service capabilities and service efforts. The speculative behavior of logistics contracting enterprises will reduce the logistics services, damage the interests of logistics contracting enterprises, and create agency risks. Simultaneously, due to the incompleteness of the outsourcing contract, there is uncertainty in the distribution of excess gains from the linkage. Suppose the logistics contracting company is willing to share the excess profits of the linkage with the logistics contracting company in an incentive manner. In that case, it can induce the logistics contracting company to increase the willingness to cooperate actively, thereby improving the level of logistics services. However, some logistics contracting companies pay too much attention to immediate benefits and are unwilling to motive logistics contracting companies, resulting in insufficient returns for logistics contracting companies, thus enhancing the speculative tendency of logistics contracting companies and creating incentive issues. Therefore, in the manufacturing and logistics industry linkage system, the game strategy of the logistics outsourcing company is incentive and no incentive. The linkage system between the manufacturing industry and the logistics industry is formed through its evolution. Logistics outsourcing companies and logistics contracting companies choose and adjust their respective strategies according to each other's strategic choices, considering their relative adaptability in the group.
We set model symbols and descriptions, then make evolutionary game analysis. We get the equilibrium points shown in table 1, the evolutionary stable strategies in table 2. The game payoff matrix under the reward and punishment mechanism is shown in table 3. We make assumption of the value of each parameter to finish the numerical simulation.

假设制造与物流产业联动系统由市场中的物流外包企业群体与物流承接企业群体构成。双方的合作基于委托代理关系建立，以获取联动系统的超额利润。由于信息不对称，物流承接企业完全掌握自身服务能力、服务成本等私有信息，而物流外包企业仅能观测事后结果，无法准确获知代理方的真实信息。物流承接企业本愿意共享信息、降低物流风险成本，以提升联动合作的收益。但考虑到物流外包市场服务同质化严重、市场竞争激烈且服务利润率偏低，部分物流承接企业会选择投机而非共享真实信息，通过夸大自身物流服务能力与服务投入，获取更多合作机会并谋取更多投机收益。物流承接企业的投机行为将降低物流服务水平，损害物流外包企业的利益，并引发代理风险。同时，由于外包合同存在不完备性，联动系统的超额收益分配存在不确定性。若物流外包企业愿意以激励方式与物流承接企业共享联动超额利润，则可诱导物流承接企业提升主动合作意愿，进而提升物流服务水平。但部分物流外包企业过度关注短期收益，不愿对物流承接企业进行激励，导致物流承接企业的收益不足，从而加剧其投机倾向，引发激励问题。因此，在制造与物流产业联动系统中，物流外包企业的博弈策略为「实施激励」与「不实施激励」。制造与物流产业联动系统通过演化形成，物流外包企业与物流承接企业会结合群体内的相对适配性，依据对方的策略选择调整自身策略。我们先设定模型符号并进行说明，随后开展演化博弈分析，得到如表1所示的均衡点，以及如表2所示的演化稳定策略。奖惩机制下的博弈收益矩阵如表3所示。我们通过设定各参数的取值完成数值仿真模拟。