The Formation of Social Conventions in Real-Time Environments

Why are some behaviors governed by strong social conventions while others are not? We experimentally investigate two factors contributing to the formation of conventions in a game of impure coordination: the continuity of interaction within each round of play (simultaneous vs. real-time) and the stakes of the interaction (high vs. low differences between payoffs). To maximize efficiency and fairness in this game, players must coordinate on one of two equally advantageous equilibria. In agreement with other studies manipulating continuity of interaction, we find that players who were allowed to interact continuously within rounds achieved outcomes with greater efficiency and fairness than players who were forced to make simultaneous decisions. However, the stability of equilibria in the real-time condition varied systematically and dramatically with stakes: players converged on more stable patterns of behavior when stakes are high. To account for this result, we present a novel analysis of the dynamics of continuous interaction and signaling within rounds. We discuss this previously unconsidered interaction between within-trial and across-trial dynamics as a form of social canalization. When stakes are low in a real-time environment, players can satisfactorily coordinate ‘on the fly’, but when stakes are high there is increased pressure to establish and adhere to shared expectations that persist across rounds.

为何部分行为受强社会惯例约束，而另一些却不然？我们在不纯协调博弈（impure coordination game）中，通过实验探究了影响惯例形成的两类因素：每轮互动的连续性（同步模式vs实时模式）以及互动的收益激励强度（收益差高vs低）。为最大化该博弈的效率与公平性，参与者需在两种同等有利的均衡点间达成协调。与其他操纵互动连续性的研究结论一致，我们发现：被允许在轮次内开展连续互动的参与者，其达成的结果相较被迫进行同步决策的参与者，具备更高的效率与公平性。不过，实时条件下的均衡稳定性会随收益激励强度发生显著且系统性的变化：当收益激励强度较高时，参与者会收敛至更稳定的行为模式。为解释这一结果，我们针对轮次内连续互动与信号传递的动态机制提出了全新分析。我们将此前未被纳入考量的试内与试间动态间的相互作用，界定为社会渠化（social canalization）的一种形式。当实时环境下收益激励强度较低时，参与者可顺畅地‘临场’达成协调；但当收益激励强度较高时，建立并恪守跨轮次持续的共同预期的压力会显著提升。