Rethinking Models of Civil War Settlement

The current study is a replication and expansion of an earlier piece by Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) exploring civil war settlement characteristics and stability. Their research focused on the importance of territorial autonomy provisions and the role of third party guarantors in predicting settlement success and stability. They employed a model that controlled for such conflict characteristics as international system structure, nature of the previous regime, conflict duration, conflict issue, and conflict intensity. Our study replicates Hartzell et al. using the Regan (2001) civil war dataset, employing a broader definition of conflict and a more stringent definition of when a conflict has ended. The results presented here differ from the previous study to have find that the importance of territorial autonomy provisions as a predictor of settlement stability is greatly diluted when one examines only those conflict settlements that have lasted for six months or longer without reciprocated violence. Third-party guarantors, however, remain a strong factor determining conflict settlement stability in the revised dataset. We also expand the previous work by including cases where the conflict ended through military victories, as well as by adding a dimension to the negotiated settlement variable that separates settlements that were coerced due to external military presence from those that were not coerced.

本研究系对Hartzell、Hoddie与Rothchild（2001）的早期研究的复刻与拓展，该早期研究聚焦内战停火协议的特征与稳定性。其研究探讨了领土自治条款的重要性，以及第三方担保方在预测停火协议成功与稳定性中的作用。他们采用控制变量模型，涵盖国际体系结构、前政权性质、冲突时长、冲突议题与冲突烈度等冲突相关特征。本研究使用Regan（2001）内战数据集复刻Hartzell等人的研究，采用更宽泛的冲突定义，以及更为严格的冲突终止判定标准。本研究所得结果与既往研究存在差异：仅考察持续六个月及以上且未发生相互暴力行为的冲突停火协议时，领土自治条款作为停火稳定性预测因子的重要性会大幅削弱。然而，第三方担保方仍是修正后数据集中决定冲突停火协议稳定性的关键因素。本研究同时拓展了既往研究的范畴，纳入以军事胜利告终的冲突案例，并为谈判停火协议变量新增一个维度，用以区分因外部军事存在而被迫达成的停火协议与非被迫达成的停火协议。