Data and Code for: Interactions and Coordination between Monetary and Macro-Prudential Policies

Abstract: I study monetary and macro-prudential policy intervention in a general equilibrium economy with recurrent boom-bust cycles. Recurrence causes forward-looking variables to also react to policy intervention during phases in which the intervention is inactive. Macro-prudential policies that contain systemic risk in financial markets during booms, therefore, relax market-based funding constraints during busts, which helps mitigate the severity and shorten the duration of economic meltdowns. Contractionary monetary interventions during booms also have (latent) beneficial effects during busts. Coordination between the two policy instruments improves social welfare over standard, non coordinated policy interventions, but improvement is moderate.

摘要：本文针对存在周期性繁荣-萧条周期（Recurrent Boom-Bust Cycles）的一般均衡经济体（General Equilibrium Economy），研究其货币政策与宏观审慎政策（Macro-prudential Policy）干预问题。周期性繁荣-萧条的反复出现，会使得前瞻性变量（Forward-looking Variables）在政策干预非活跃阶段，同样对政策干预做出响应。因此，在繁荣时期抑制金融市场系统性风险的宏观审慎政策，能够在萧条时期放松市场型融资约束（Market-based Funding Constraints），这有助于缓解经济崩溃的严重程度并缩短其持续时长。繁荣时期实施的紧缩性货币政策干预，在萧条阶段亦能产生（潜在的）积极效应。相较于标准非协调政策干预，两类政策工具之间的协调配合能够提升社会福利，但该提升幅度较为温和。