Replication Data to "Strategic Communication in Dictatorships: Performance, Patriotism, and Intimidation"

Research shows that dictators’ public rhetoric shapes both elite and mass opinion and behavior. However, the determinants of dictators’ strategic communication remain undertheorized and underresearched. Theoretically, we argue that: i) dictators primarily use three key communication strategies ( “performance” and “patriotism,” which serve to boost legitimacy, and “intimidation,” meant to deter opponents); ii) they substitute between them depending on the situational context. Empirically, we introduce a novel corpus of post-Soviet leaders’ legislative addresses, and then, employing semisupervised text analysis, test our argument. We find that autocrats legitimize themselves as performance-focused leaders during economic upturns, emphasize patriotism during elections, and turn to the rhetoric of intimidation when facing protests and sanctions. We further validate our theory using a global set of authoritarian speeches, in a different language. The findings support but also contest some established assumptions regarding how and when dictators’ communication changes.

研究表明，独裁者的公开言论会同时影响精英与大众的舆论及行为。然而，目前针对独裁者战略传播的决定因素，相关理论构建仍显不足，实证研究亦较为匮乏。从理论层面而言，本文提出如下核心论点：其一，独裁者主要采用三类核心传播策略：旨在提升执政合法性的「施政绩效（performance）」与「爱国主义（patriotism）」，以及用于威慑反对者的「恐吓（intimidation）」；其二，他们会依据具体情境在不同策略间灵活切换替代。实证层面，本文构建了一套全新的后苏联时代国家领导人立法演说语料库，并借助半监督文本分析方法对本文的核心论点进行了检验。研究结果显示，独裁统治者在经济上行期会将自身塑造为聚焦施政绩效的领导者以获取执政合法性，在选举期间则会强化爱国主义叙事，而在遭遇抗议活动与制裁措施时，则会转向恐吓性言论。本文还采用一套覆盖全球、涵盖不同语种的专制政权演说语料，对本文的理论框架进行了进一步验证。本研究结果既支持了部分关于独裁者言论调整的既有学术假设，同时也对其中部分论断提出了质疑。