Replication data for: Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime-Type on Terrorist Attacks

Though empirical research has generally demonstrated that democracies experience more terrorism than autocracies, research suggests that this depends upon complex institutional differences that go beyond the democracy-autocracy divide. This study examines these differences, linking institutions to strategies of coercion and co-optation. Using zero-inflated negative binomial regression estimations on Geddes’ (2003) autocratic regime-type data for 161 countries between 1970 and 2006, we find that single-party authoritarian regimes consistently experience less domestic and international terrorism relative to military autocracies and democracies. This finding is robust to a large number of specifications, underscoring the explanatory power of regime type for predicting terrorism. Our explanation for these findings is that party-based autocracies have a wider range of coercion and co-option strategies that they can employ to address grievance and dissent than do other, more strategically restricted regimes.

尽管经验研究普遍认为民主政体比独裁政体更易遭遇恐怖主义，但现有研究表明，这一结论取决于超越民主-独裁二分法的复杂制度差异。本研究针对此类差异展开分析，将制度与强制压制和笼络吸纳策略建立关联。我们采用格迪斯（Geddes, 2003）提出的、涵盖1970年至2006年间161个国家的威权政权类型数据集，对相关样本进行零膨胀负二项回归（zero-inflated negative binomial regression）估计，结果发现：一党制威权政权相较于军事独裁政权与民主政体，始终面临更少的国内与国际恐怖主义活动。该结论在多种模型设定下均保持稳健，凸显了政权类型对恐怖主义预测的解释力。针对上述结论，我们的解释是：相较于其他战略选择受限的政权，基于政党的威权政权拥有更广泛的强制压制与笼络吸纳策略，可用于应对民众的不满与异议。