Data for: Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

Abstract of associated article: We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures. In share contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In lottery contests information feedback has an opposite, and even stronger, effect: when subjects only get feedback on own earnings we observe high levels of rent dissipation, usually exceeding the value of the rent, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings has a significant moderating influence on expenditures. In a follow-up treatment we make information feedback endogenous by allowing contestants in a lottery contest to make public or private expenditures. Subjects make the vast majority of expenditures privately and overall excess expenditures are similar to the lottery contest with own feedback.

关联论文摘要：本研究探讨了两种不同竞赛结构下寻租博弈（rent-seeking games）中的信息反馈效应。在份额竞赛（share contest）中，竞赛者获得的租金份额等于其寻租支出占总支出的比例；而在彩票式竞赛（lottery contest）中，竞赛者以等于自身寻租支出占比的概率赢得全部租金。在份额竞赛场景中，当参与者仅能获取自身收益的反馈信息时，平均支出会收敛至均衡水平；若额外补充对手的选择与收益反馈，则会推高平均支出。而在彩票式竞赛中，信息反馈则呈现相反且更为显著的效应：当参与者仅获取自身收益反馈时，租值耗散（rent dissipation）程度较高，通常超出租金本身的价值；若额外增加对手选择与收益的反馈，则会对支出产生显著的抑制作用。在后续处理组（follow-up treatment）中，我们将信息反馈设置为内生（endogenous）变量，允许彩票式竞赛中的竞赛者选择公开支出（public expenditures）或私人支出（private expenditures）。绝大多数参与者选择私人支出，整体超额支出（excess expenditures）水平与仅获得自身收益反馈的彩票式竞赛场景相近。