Replication Data for: Manipulating Remittances: Strengthening Autocratic Regimes with Currency Overvaluation and Remittance Flows

This paper investigates the link between remittances and autocratic regime stability. It challenges the prevailing assumption that remittances cannot be directly captured as a source of hard capital by states, and proposes that remittances increase regime durability by incentivizing and enabling currency overvaluation and seigniorage revenue generation in autocratic states that produce non-freely convertible currencies. It uses cross-national time-series data from autocratic regimes in Sub-Saharan African countries from 1975-2015 to test this theory. The analysis shows that remittances increase autocratic regime durability in countries that have monopoly control over domestic currency production.

本研究考察汇款与威权政权稳定之间的关联。本研究对“国家无法将汇款直接作为硬通货资本来源加以获取”这一主流预设提出质疑，并提出：在发行非自由兑换货币的威权国家中，汇款可通过激励并推动货币高估与铸币税（seigniorage）收入创造，提升政权存续性。本研究采用1975年至2015年间撒哈拉以南非洲国家威权政权的跨国时间序列数据，对上述理论进行检验。分析结果表明，在对本国货币发行拥有垄断控制权的国家中，汇款能够提升威权政权的存续性。