Data for: The incentive effects of missions—Evidence from experiments with NGO employees and students

Abstract of associated article: This paper studies the incentive effects of an organization׳s ‘mission’ on the effort provision of agents. Across treatments, I exogenously vary how much the agents׳ and their projects׳ missions match. In the first study, NGO employees are assigned the role of agents in an online, one-shot, principal-agent experiment. In the second study, I replicate the experimental design with a student subject pool. In both experiments the agents׳ effort choices are, for any given piece rate, increasing in their mission match. In a third study, a laboratory experiment with a finitely repeated principal-agent game with random matching, I do not find a motivational effect of missions, unlike in my first two studies.

关联论文摘要：本文探讨了组织"使命"对代理人努力供给的激励效应。在各实验处理中，我外生调整了代理人及其所负责项目与组织使命的匹配程度。第一项研究中，非政府组织（Non-Governmental Organization，NGO）员工在在线单次委托-代理实验中担任代理人角色。第二项研究则以学生被试库为样本，重复了该实验设计。两项实验均表明：在给定计件工资率的条件下，代理人的努力选择会随其与使命的匹配度提升而增加。第三项研究为带有随机匹配机制的有限重复委托-代理博弈实验室实验，与前两项研究不同，本研究未发现使命产生的动机效应。