Executive approval and accountability: the impact of global shocks in less developed democracies

This article offers an original theory which elucidates how voters in less developed settings evaluate macroeconomic performance and fiscal policies. We argue that voters face a critical challenge in the attribution of responsibility in an era of global market integration. We then present a theory where the complex interaction between the economy, government policies, and executive approval is understood by considering that there are substantial differences between ordinary times, and periods in which large-scale, global exogenous shocks hit the domestic economy. In ordinary times, voters evaluate incumbents for economic performance and policy. During large-scale exogenous shocks, however, voters continue to assess incumbent competence, but the task of making performance and policy-based evaluations is much harder as it depends on a more sophisticated understanding of the source of the shock, and what types of fiscal and monetary responses might be more appropriate to mitigate the effect of the crisis. We test our assumptions and theoretical expectations with monthly data for Brazil from 1997 to 2022.

本文提出一套原创理论，阐释欠发达语境下选民如何评价宏观经济表现与财政政策。本文认为，在全球市场一体化时代，选民在责任归因层面面临重大挑战。随后本文提出一套理论框架，通过区分常态时期与大规模全球外生冲击波及国内经济的时期，解析经济运行、政府政策与行政当局支持度之间的复杂互动逻辑。常态时期，选民会基于经济表现与政策表现对现任执政者展开评价。然而在大规模外生冲击时期，选民仍会评估现任执政者的执政能力，但基于经济表现与政策表现开展评价的难度显著提升——这要求选民对冲击来源具备更为精深的认知，同时需明晰何种财政与货币政策组合更适于缓解危机的负面影响。本文采用巴西1997年至2022年的月度数据，对本文提出的核心假设与理论预期进行实证检验。