Replication Data for: How Does International Intervention Help Secure Peace Settlements After Civil Conflicts?

There is emerging consensus that international intervention can secure peace by helping combatants resolve commitment problems following civil wars. But how do interveners accomplish this? Some imply that intervention primarily works through military coercion, while others suggest non-military instruments. We build on the existing literature to theorize that interveners commonly condition political, economic, and legal incentives on compliance with peace processes. Despite a rich literature on intervention, scholars have only started to test the underlying instruments. This paper takes a critical step toward this end, examining peacekeeping missions led by the United Nations from 1989-2012. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show military coercion is neither commonly used nor necessary to ensure peace. Missions that employ conditional incentives—on which we collect original data—are consistently correlated with a reduced risk of conflict recurrence, even when controlling for observed selection effects, and regardless of whether LM_Intervention_Replication.zipthey are also authorized to use military coercion.

学界已逐渐形成共识：国际干预可通过协助内战交战双方解决承诺问题（commitment problems），从而实现和平。但干预方究竟如何实现这一目标？部分研究认为，干预主要通过军事胁迫发挥作用；另有观点则主张依托非军事工具达成目的。
本文基于既有研究文献构建理论框架，提出干预方通常会将政治、经济与法律激励与遵守和平进程的行为绑定。尽管关于国际干预的研究已颇为丰富，但学者们才刚刚开始对其背后的核心工具开展实证检验。
本文为此迈出关键一步，聚焦1989年至2012年间联合国主导的维和行动展开研究。与传统学术认知相悖，我们的研究表明，军事胁迫既非常规使用的手段，也并非保障和平的必要条件。我们收集了原始数据以量化附带条件的激励措施的使用情况，结果显示，采用此类激励措施的维和行动，始终与更低的冲突复发风险显著相关——即便在控制了观测到的选择效应（selection effects）、且无论这些任务是否被授权使用军事胁迫手段（相关复制数据文件为LM_Intervention_Replication.zip）的情况下，该结论依然成立。