Replication Data for: Preemptive Multipartism and Democratic Transitions

Students of authoritarian rule debate whether the presence of multiple parties in the legislature stabilizes dictatorships or promotes their demise. We show that authoritarian regimes face a quandary: allowing for multipartism reduces the risk of bottom-up revolt, but paves the way for protracted top-down democratization. Concessions to the opposition diminish the long-term benefits of authoritarian rule and empower regime soft-liners. We provide evidence from Latin America—a region with a broad range of authoritarian regimes—and test our theory using survival models, instrumental variable estimators, random forest ensembles, and two case studies. Our theory explains why rational autocrats accept multipartism, even though this concession may ultimately undermine the regime. It also accounts for democratic transitions that occur when the opposition is fragmented and in the absence of a stunning authoritarian defeat.