Data for: The relationship between federal budget amendments and local electoral power

Abstract of associated article: The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we investigate whether politicians use resources from the federal budget to maintain and expand their political capital. Second, we examine whether such strategy is rewarded by voters. Do they vote for politicians who assist their municipalities through federal expenditures? We use data from legislative elections in Brazil, a country that does not use a single member district system to form its Chamber of Deputies. We use a regression discontinuity approach by exploring the results of close elections for the Chamber of Deputies. Our findings indicate that politicians tend to favor municipalities that were important to their elections and that voters support candidates who have brought resources to their localities.

关联学术论文摘要：本文兼具双重研究目标：其一，探究政客是否会借助联邦预算资源维系并扩张自身政治资本；其二，检验此类策略能否获得选民的正向回馈，即选民是否会为那些通过联邦财政支出为本市镇提供帮扶的政客投出支持票。本次研究采用巴西议会选举相关数据，该国众议院并非采用单一选区制选举产生。研究借助众议院势均力敌的选举结果，采用断点回归分析方法开展实证研究。结果显示，政客往往会偏袒对其选举至关重要的市镇，且选民会支持那些为本地区争取到资源的候选人。