Data for: Corrupt governments do not receive more state-to-state aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-state actors

Abstract of associated article: A core result of the aid allocation literature is that the quality of governance in recipient countries does not affect the amounts of foreign aid received. Donor countries may still give aid to poorly-governed countries because of a dilemma they face: those countries most in need typically also lack proper institutions. This paper argues that donors try to resolve this dilemma by delivering aid through non-state actors. Using aid shares as well as absolute amounts of aid allocated through state and non-state channels and considering different dimensions of governance, we provide evidence that bypassing governments via NGOs and multilateral organizations is indeed a response to weak recipient state institutions. The effect is stronger in aid sectors where donors can more easily switch between channels, and weaker for higher levels of economic self-interest among donors.

关联论文摘要：外援分配研究领域的一项核心结论显示，受援国的治理质量并不会影响其获取的外援规模。尽管如此，援助捐赠国仍可能向治理不善的国家提供援助，这源于其面临的一项两难困境：最亟需援助的国家往往同样缺乏健全的制度体系。本文提出，捐赠国可通过非国家行为体（non-state actors）发放援助，以此破解这一困境。本文基于国家渠道与非国家渠道分配的援助占比及绝对规模数据，并结合治理的不同维度展开分析，提供了实证证据，证明通过非政府组织（NGOs）与多边组织绕开受援国政府，确实是对受援国国家制度孱弱的应对策略。在捐赠国可更灵活切换援助渠道的领域，这一效应更为显著；而捐赠国的经济自利性越强，这一效应则越弱。