Replication Data for: Modeling the Institutional Foundations of Parliamentary Government Formation

That neither the assumptions nor the predictions of standard government formation models entirely correspond to empirical findings has led some to conclude that theoretical accounts of government formation should be reconsidered from the bottom up. We take up this challenge by presenting a zero-intelligence model of government formation. In our model, three or more parties that care about office and policy make random government proposals. The only constraints that we impose on government formation correspond to the two binding constitutional constraints that exist in all parliamentary systems: an incumbent government always exists and all governments must enjoy majority legislative support. Despite its deliberately limited structure, our model predicts distributions over portfolio allocation, government types, and bargaining delays that approach those observed in the real world. Our analysis suggests that many formation outcomes may result from the institutional foundation of parliamentary democracies, independent of the strategic behavior of party leaders.

标准政府组建模型的假设与预测均无法完全契合经验研究结果，这使得部分学者认为，政府组建的理论阐释应当自下而上地进行重新审视。我们通过提出政府组建的零智能（zero-intelligence）模型来回应这一研究挑战。在该模型中，三名及以上同时兼顾职位诉求与政策立场的政党会随机提出政府组建方案。我们对政府组建过程设定的唯一约束，契合所有议会制体系中均存在的两项具有约束力的宪法规则：其一，始终存在现任政府；其二，所有政府均须获得议会多数立法支持。尽管该模型的结构刻意设置得较为简洁，但它所预测的内阁席位分配、政府类型与谈判耗时的分布特征，均与现实世界中观测到的结果高度趋近。我们的分析表明，诸多政府组建结果或许源于议会民主制的制度根基，而与政党领袖的策略性行为并无关联。