The Negotiation Calculus: Why Parties to Civil Conflict Refuse to Talk

Why do some parties to intrastate conflict refuse to negotiate? I propose a simple theory of civil conflict in which the act of negotiation itself carries costs and benefits. Several hypotheses follow: parties to civil conflict will avoid negotiation when they (1) fear alienating external supporters or internal constituencies, (2) risk granting legitimacy to their opponents or signaling weakness to other potential claimants, or (3) find it difficult to identify reliable negotiating partners. Empirical tests find support for my argument. My findings suggest that cases exist in which the parties would reach an agreement if only they could overcome the costs of negotiation and engage in talks. Diplomats and mediators should consider the costs and benefits of talks when planning the timing and form of interventions designed to bring parties to the table.

为何国内冲突（intrastate conflict）中的部分当事方拒绝开展谈判？本文提出一套关于内战的简约理论，认为谈判行为本身兼具成本与收益。由此可推导出若干假说：内战当事方会在以下情形下规避谈判：其一，担忧疏远外部支持者或内部选民群体；其二，面临向对手赋予合法性、或是向其他潜在诉求方传递自身软弱信号的风险；其三，难以识别可靠的谈判伙伴。实证检验为本研究论点提供了支撑。研究结果表明，存在此类冲突案例：若当事方能克服谈判的相关成本并开展对话，便可达成协议。外交官与调停者在筹划旨在推动冲突当事方坐到谈判桌前的干预行动的时机与形式时，应充分考量谈判的成本与收益。