The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w32378
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资源简介：
Research on centralized school assignment mechanisms often focuses on whether parents who participate in specific mechanisms are likely to truthfully report their preferences or engage in various costly strategic behaviors. However, a growing literature suggests that parents may not know enough
针对集中式学校分配机制（centralized school assignment mechanisms）的相关研究，往往聚焦于参与特定分配机制的家长是否会如实申报自身偏好，或是采取各类需付出成本的策略性行为。然而，日益丰富的相关研究文献表明，家长可能并不具备足够的
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2024-04-01
