The politics of fiscal rules within the European Union: a dynamic analysis of fiscal rules stringency

Over the last 25 years, fiscal rules (FRs) have been proliferating in Europe bringing in-depth change to the architecture of fiscal institutions. This paper investigates different theories explaining the changes in national fiscal rules stringency (FRS) using a panel of 28 European countries from 1990 to 2013. The authors found evidence that fiscal stress prevents fiscal reform in the short term, and leads to stronger fiscal rules in the long term. This pattern corresponds to the ‘war of attrition’ argument formulated by Alesina and Drazen [(1989) ‘Why are stabilizations delayed?’, <i>The American Economic Review</i> 81(5): 1170–88]. The authors found evidence that countries eager to join the EU showed their commitment to Maastricht targets by incorporating FRs into national laws. Countries facing financial difficulties after the 2009 sovereign debt crisis were coerced into adopting more stringent FRs to obtain fiscal support from the EU. Both cases support the idea that coercive diplomacy might explain the strength of national fiscal rules in the EU.

过去25年间，财政规则（Fiscal Rules, FRs）在欧洲持续普及，对财政制度架构带来了深刻变革。本文基于1990年至2013年涵盖28个欧洲国家的面板数据，对解释各国财政规则严格程度（Fiscal Rules Stringency, FRS）变化的各类理论展开了研究。作者发现，财政压力会在短期内阻碍财政改革，但长期来看会推动财政规则趋于严格。这一规律与阿尔西纳和德拉赞（Alesina and Drazen）1989年提出的“消耗战（war of attrition）”理论相契合，该理论刊载于《美国经济评论》第81卷第5期，页码为1170至1188页，文章标题为《为何稳定化政策会被延迟？》。作者还发现，渴望加入欧盟（European Union, EU）的国家会通过将财政规则纳入本国法律，以此展现其对马斯特里赫特目标的承诺。2009年主权债务危机后陷入财政困境的国家，则被迫采纳更为严格的财政规则以换取欧盟的财政援助。上述两种情形均印证了“胁迫性外交（coercive diplomacy）”可用于解释欧盟各国财政规则严格程度的观点。