Replication Data for: Economic Crises and Trade Policy Competition

How do crises affect trade policy? We reconcile starkly diverging accounts in the literature by showing that economic adversity generates endogenous incentives not only for protection, but also for liberalization. We first develop formally the mechanisms by which two features of shocks---intensity and duration---influence the resources and political strategies of distressed firms. Our central insight is that policy adjustments to resuscitate afflicted industries typically generate \"knock-on\" effects on the profitability and political maneuverings of other firms in the economy. We incorporate these countervailing pressures in our analysis of trade policy competition. In the wake of crises, protection initially increases when impacted firms lobby for assistance, but then decreases as industries run low on resources to expend on lobbying and as firms in other industries mobilize to counter-lobby. We test our theoretical predictions using sub-national and cross-national data and present real-world illustrations to highlight the mechanisms driving our results.

危机如何影响贸易政策？本研究通过揭示经济困境不仅会催生贸易保护（protection）的内生动机，同时也会引发贸易自由化（liberalization）的内生激励，调和了现有文献中截然不同的学术观点。本研究首先正式构建了冲击的两大特征——强度与持续时长——如何影响受困企业的资源储备与政治策略的作用机制。本研究的核心洞察在于：旨在纾困受困行业的政策调整，通常会对经济体中其他企业的盈利能力与政治游说活动产生连锁（knock-on）效应。我们将这些抵消性压力纳入贸易政策博弈的分析框架。危机过后，贸易保护程度起初会因受冲击企业游说寻求援助而上升，但随着相关行业的游说资源耗尽，以及其他行业的企业动员开展反游说活动，贸易保护程度随后会出现下降。本研究利用次国家级与跨国数据对理论预测进行了实证检验，并辅以现实案例阐释了驱动研究结果的核心机制。