Replication Data for: Foreign Aid, Human Rights and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Does foreign aid improve human rights and democracy? We help arbitrate the
debate over this question by leveraging a novel source of exogeneity: the rotating
presidency of the Council of the European Union. We find that when a country’s
former colonizer holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union during
the budget-making process, the country is allocated considerably more foreign aid than are countries whose former colonizer does not hold the presidency. Using instrumental variables estimation, we demonstrate that this aid has positive effects on human rights and democracy, although the effects are short-lived after the shock to aid dissipates. We adduce the timing of events, qualitative evidence, and theoretical insights to argue that the conditionality associated with an increased aid commitment is responsible for the positive effects in the domains of human rights and democracy.

对外援助能否改善人权与民主状况？我们借助欧盟理事会（Council of the European Union）轮值主席国制度这一全新的外生变量来源，为这场围绕该问题的争论提供仲裁依据。研究发现，若某国的前殖民宗主国在欧盟理事会预算编制流程期间担任轮值主席国，该国获得的对外援助额度将显著高于前殖民宗主国未担任该职务的国家。通过工具变量估计法，我们证实此类对外援助对人权与民主状况具有积极影响，但当援助冲击消退后，该效应仅能短暂存续。我们援引事件时序、定性证据与理论视角，论证指出：援助承诺增加所附带的附加条件，正是人权与民主领域产生积极效应的核心原因。