Replication data for: How Diffusion of Power in Parliaments Affects Voter Choice

I analyze how the diffusion of power in parliaments affects voter choice. Using a two-step research design, I first estimate an individual-level model of voter choice in 14 parliamentary democracies, allowing voters to hold preferences both for the party most similar to them ideologically and for the party that pulls policy in their direction. While in systems in which power is concentrated the two motivations converge, in consensual systems they diverge: since votes will likely be watered down by bargaining in the parliament, outcome-oriented choice in consensual systems often leads voters to endorse parties whose positions differ from their own views. In the second step, I utilize institutional measures of power diffusion in the parliament to account for the degree to which voters in different polities pursue one motivation versus the other. I demonstrate that the more power diffusion and compromise built into the political system via institutional mechanisms, the more voters compensate for the watering down of their vote by endorsing parties whose positions differ from their own views.

本文分析议会权力分散程度对选民投票选择的影响。本研究采用两步式研究设计：首先针对14个议会制民主国家构建选民投票选择的个体层面模型，允许选民同时存在两种偏好倾向——一是偏好意识形态与自身最为契合的政党，二是偏好能够推动符合自身诉求的政策方向的政党。在权力集中的政治体制中，这两种投票动机趋于一致；而在共识型体制下，二者则出现分化：由于议会中的讨价还价往往会削弱选票的实际效力，共识体制下以政策结果为导向的投票选择，常会促使选民支持与自身政见相悖的政党。第二步，本研究采用议会权力分散的制度性衡量指标，以解释不同政体下的选民更倾向于遵循哪一种投票动机。研究结果表明，政治体制中通过制度机制形成的权力分散与妥协程度越高，选民就越会通过支持与自身政见相悖的政党，来弥补选票效力被削弱的影响。