Replication Data for: The Politics of International Oversight: Strategic Monitoring and Legal Compliance in the European Union

Replication data and code to reproduce the analysis and figures. Abstract: States often violate international agreements, both accidentally and intentionally. To process complaints efficiently, states can create formal, pre-trial procedures in which governments can negotiate with litigants before a case ever goes to court. If disputes are resolved during pre-trial negotiations, it can be very difficult to tell what has happened. Are governments coming into compliance? If so, are they only doing so when they have accidentally committed a violation, or even when they are intentionally resisting? Or are challenges simply being dropped? This paper presents a formal model to address these questions. We develop our theory in the context of the European Union (EU). To test our model, we collect a new data set of over 13,000 Commission infringement cases against EU member states (2003–2013). Our results suggest that accidental and intentional noncompliance both occur, but that intentional noncompliance is more common in the EU. We find that the Commission is an effective, if imperfect, monitor and enforcer of international law. The Commission can correct intentional noncompliance, but not always. It strategically drops cases that it believes it is unlikely to win.

用于复现本研究分析与图表的复现数据与代码。
摘要：国家时常会意外或故意违反国际协定。为高效处理申诉，各国可设立正式审前程序，使政府能够在案件正式开庭前与诉讼方开展磋商。若争端在审前磋商阶段得到解决，则往往难以厘清实际原委：各国政府是否会遵守相关协定？若遵守，其仅会在意外违反协定的情况下履约，还是即便故意拒不遵守时也会履约？抑或是相关申诉仅被直接撤销？本文构建正式模型以解答上述问题。我们以欧洲联盟（EU）为研究场景开展理论构建。为验证所构建的模型，我们收集了2003年至2013年间欧盟委员会针对欧盟成员国发起的13000余起侵权案件的全新数据集。研究结果表明，意外不履约与故意不履约行为均有发生，但欧盟范围内故意不履约更为常见。我们发现，欧盟委员会虽并非完美无缺，但仍是国际法的高效监督与执行主体。欧盟委员会能够纠正故意不履约行为，但并非总能奏效；其会战略性地撤销那些自认为胜诉概率较低的案件。