Relative Power and Costly Signals of Civilian Loyalty: Protest Behavior Against Armed Actors in the Colombian Civil War, 1990–2004

The paper examines one of many actions that civilians employ to resists peacefully armed actors during civil wars: protests. I argue that the costs for mobilizing against armed actors depend on the level of control that armed actors exert in the territory. By examining the civil war in Colombia between 1990 and 2004, I find that civilians protest against the weaker actor to reveal their loyalty to the dominant actor and to prevent the strong side from conducting future violent actions against the population. Protesting works as a costly signal of loyalty. I reveal that non-combatants protest against the stronger actor when both civilians and combatants share the same political ideology. In that circumstance, punishment by the strong combatants is improbable as protesting against them is likely to be interpreted as a renegotiation of the contract or a reminder of its terms. Finally, I show that civilians in contested zones declare themselves neutral and protest against both sides. Non-combatants take advantage of the power contestation to improve their current situation. Any punishment by combatants in contested zones would lead to defection, and citizens protest against both actors knowing that armed actors cannot afford to punish non-combatants for their hostile attitude.

本研究探讨了内战期间平民用以和平对抗武装行为体（armed actors）的诸多行动之一：抗议示威。本文提出，平民动员起来对抗武装行为体的成本，取决于该武装行为体对其控制区域的管控力度。通过考察1990年至2004年的哥伦比亚内战，本文发现平民会选择向弱势武装行为体发起抗议，以此彰显自身对强势主导方的忠诚，并阻止强势方日后针对平民实施暴力行动。抗议示威可作为彰显忠诚的高成本信号。研究表明，当平民与战斗人员持有相同政治意识形态时，非战斗人员会转而抗议强势一方的武装行为体。在此情形下，强势战斗人员不会实施惩罚，因为针对他们的抗议大概率会被解读为对双方既有约定的重新磋商，或是对约定条款的提醒。最后，本研究显示，在双方争夺的管控区域内，平民会宣布自身保持中立，并同时向两方武装行为体发起抗议。非战斗人员会借由权力博弈的契机，改善自身当下处境。管控区域内的战斗人员若实施惩罚，势必会引发非战斗人员倒戈；而平民正是洞悉到武装行为体无法承受因敌对态度惩罚非战斗人员的代价，才会同时向两方发起抗议。