Fenomenologia e filosofia (neo-)carnapiana: il dato tra sedimentazione e determinazione

This paper argues that the Carnapian ostracism of certain ontological hypotheses, partially shared with Husserlian phenomenology, does not depend on the linguistic turn in philosophy. Instead, it hinges on a fundamental change in the concept of givenness that underlies the theory of experience.

本文论证，卡尔纳普式（Carnapian）对特定本体论假说的摒除，与胡塞尔式现象学存在部分共通之处，该立场并不依赖于哲学中的语言学转向。与之相反，其核心依据在于作为经验理论之基础的被给予性（givenness）概念发生了根本性转变。