Replication Data for: Constituency Service and Electoral Accountability in Autocratic Legislatures

How do political outsiders in autocratic legislatures use institutional authorities? I argue that legislative authorities tailored to offering constituency service help to level the playing field between regime and opposition candidates competing for the crucial resource of public support. Though regime candidates may have the ear of those in power through backdoor channels and personal connections, opposition politicians can use `by the book' politics -- the legitimate authorities that accompany their office -- to supply the constituency goods voters expect. I construct a database of activity from recent legislative terms in Morocco, including more than 27000 unique queries submitted by elected members of parliament to government ministers, and find systematic evidence that voters reward parties and MPs that engage in more constituency service via institutionalized action. Yet the relationship between activity and voteshare is exclusive to opposition parties: regime-linked parties do not see electoral gains from increased legislative activity, but neither are they punished for shirking in office.

威权立法机构中的政治局外人如何运用制度性职权？本文认为，专为提供选区服务而设立的立法职权，可在争夺公共支持这一关键资源的执政阵营与反对阵营候选人之间构建起公平竞争的平台。尽管执政阵营候选人可通过后门渠道与私人关系直接攀附当权者，但反对党政客可借助依规行事的政治手段——即与其公职绑定的合法职权——为选民提供其期待的选区服务。本研究构建了摩洛哥近期立法任期内的活动数据库，涵盖当选议员向政府部长提交的逾27000条独立质询，并发现系统性证据表明，选民会奖励那些通过制度化行动开展更多选区服务的政党与议员。然而，议员活动与得票率之间的关联仅局限于反对党阵营：与执政阵营绑定的政党并未因立法活动增多而获得选举收益，同时也不会因履职懈怠而遭到惩罚。