Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement
收藏NBER2019-01-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
下载链接：
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25463
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资源简介：
We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of
本文研究一类政府在公共支出决策中存在现时偏向（present bias）的财政政策模型。社会将选择一项财政规则，在约束政府避免过度支出的收益与赋予其灵活应对私人观测到的价值冲击的收益之间进行权衡
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2019-01-01
