Replication Data for: Sleeping with the Enemy: Effective Representation Under Dynamic Electoral Competition

Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties---among other unconventional electoral strategies---may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics. However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations. We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short-term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition parties (and voters) the opportunity to remove an entrenched incumbent party from office, thus leveling the playing field in the future. This tradeoff provides a previously unrecognized rationale for coalition formation in elections. We take our model to data from Mexican municipal elections between 1995-2016 and show that coalitions between parties on opposite ends of the ideology spectrum have served as an instrument of democratic consolidation.

意识形态相悖政党间的选举联盟（electoral coalitions），连同其他非传统选举策略，看似会对有效代表构成威胁，亦预示着纲领性政治的瓦解。然而，这一视角忽视了政党与选民的动态考量。我们提出并估计了一个动态选举竞争（dynamic electoral competition）模型：在该模型中，通过选举联盟实现的短期意识形态妥协，能为反对党（及选民）提供将根深蒂固的在任政党赶下台的契机，进而为未来营造公平竞争的环境。这种权衡为选举中的联盟组建提供了此前未被认知的理论依据。我们将模型应用于1995年至2016年墨西哥市政选举的数据，研究表明，意识形态光谱两端政党间的联盟，已成为民主巩固的工具。