A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure
收藏NBER2004-07-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w10615
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We consider a principal-agent model in which the agent needs to raise capital from the principal to finance a project. Our model is based on DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), except that the agent's cash flows are given by a Brownian motion with drift in continuous time. The difficulty in writing an
本文研究一类委托-代理模型（principal-agent model）：代理人需从委托人处筹集资金以推进项目融资。本模型以DeMarzo与Fishman（2003）的研究为基础，仅将代理人的现金流设定为连续时间框架下的带漂移布朗运动（Brownian motion with drift）。而撰写相关文书的难点在于
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2004-07-01
