Replication Data for: Policing the Organizational Threat in Morocco: Protest and Public Violence in Liberal Autocracies

As a prominent form of state violence against civilians, protest policing represents the type of coercion that "liberal" autocrats seek to minimize. Departing from aggregate notions of "mass threat" that dominate studies of authoritarian response to contention, this paper develops an event-level model of protest policing centering the role of social movement organizations (SMOs) in shaping elite threat perceptions and, hence, the likelihood that protests will face state violence. More than public protest per se, I argue that liberal autocrats fear the rise of autonomous, national-level organizations capable of providing unregulated channels for citizen claim-making. Having forsworn the ability to control which networks become active as SMOs, liberal autocrats use protest policing to dissuade citizens from mobilizing with autonomous organizations and to protect the near-monopoly of embedded organizations over contention. I illustrate these arguments with unique protest event data from Morocco. I draw implications for the durability of liberalized regimes.

作为针对平民的国家暴力的典型形式，抗议管控警务（protest policing）乃是“自由式”独裁者力图压制的强制手段类型。相较于主流威权抗争应对研究中“群体威胁”的整体化认知范式，本文构建了一个以社会运动组织（social movement organizations, SMOs）对精英阶层威胁感知的塑造作用为核心的抗议管控警务事件层面模型，并由此推导出抗议活动遭遇国家暴力的概率。本文认为，相较于公共抗议活动本身，“自由式”独裁者更忌惮能够为公民诉求表达开辟不受监管渠道的自治性全国性组织的兴起。由于已放弃管控哪些社会运动网络能够以社会运动组织的身份活跃运行，“自由式”独裁者遂借助抗议管控警务，劝阻民众联合自治组织参与动员，并捍卫嵌入型组织在抗争活动中近乎垄断的主导地位。本文借助源自摩洛哥的独特抗议事件数据集对上述论点展开实证阐释，并据此就自由化政权的存续性问题阐发了相关启示。