Replication Data for: \"Leadership and Military Effectiveness\"

What are the sources of military effectiveness? Though for decades political scientists have studied the determinants of military effectiveness, they have generally ignored the role of military leadership, a factor that military historians and other observers have emphasized for millennia as crucial for effectiveness. This paper presents the first rigorous examination of the notion that militaries improve effectiveness by replacing low-performing leaders. The paper first presents theory as to why leadership contributes to military effectiveness. It then presents a theory describing how during wartime militaries replace low-performing leaders. It next presents hypotheses describing conditions under which low-performing leaders might not get replaced, if those leaders belong to powerful interpersonal networks, or if civilian dictators keep low-performers in place because those officers are politically loyal. Hypotheses are tested using new data on all American and German generals holding combat commands in the North African, Italian, and West European theaters in World War II, and new data on the monthly combat performance of all American and German divisions fighting in these theaters. Event history and regression analysis reveal that both armies improved effectiveness by replacing low-performing generals, and that neither interpersonal networks nor dictatorial political preferences disrupted this dynamic.

军事效能的来源何在？数十年来，政治学者虽已围绕军事效能的决定因素展开研究，但大多忽略了军事领导力的作用——而军事史学家与其他观察家数千年来始终强调，该因素对军事效能至关重要。本文首次对“军队通过替换低绩效将领以提升军事效能”这一观点开展严谨检验。首先，本文就领导力何以影响军事效能提出理论阐释；随后，构建理论框架分析战时军队替换低绩效将领的内在逻辑；继而提出假说：若低绩效将领身处强大的人际网络（interpersonal networks）之中，抑或是文职独裁者因这些军官具备政治忠诚度而留任他们，则此类将领未必会被替换。为验证上述假说，本文采用两类全新数据集：其一为第二次世界大战（World War II）期间，在北非、意大利及西欧战区（theaters）担任作战指挥职务的所有美、德两国将领的相关数据；其二为在上述战场作战的所有美、德陆军师的月度作战绩效数据。事件史分析与回归分析结果显示，美、德两军均通过替换低绩效将领提升了军事效能，且人际网络与独裁政权的政治偏好均未对这一动态产生干扰。