Contracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI

Under what conditions can governments use international commitments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Although numerous studies have attempted to answer this question, none considers how investment treaties may have heterogeneous affects across industry. I argue BIT effect is strongest when the obsolescing bargaining problem between firms and governments is most protracted, namely, when FDI relies on strong contracts between firms and states. Using a time series cross-sectional data set of 114 developing countries from 1985 to 2011, I find BITs are associated with increases in infrastructure investment, an industry particularly reliant on the sanctity of government contracts, but not with total FDI inflows. Moreover, BITs with strong arbitration provisions display the strongest statistical effect on infrastructure investment, while BITs that do not provide investors with such protections are not associated with increased investment. My results have implications for both scholarship on the relationship between governments and multinational firms as well as for the study of international institutions more broadly. To properly ascertain the effects of international treaties and institutions, scholars should consider not just whether institutions constrain or inform—or matter at all—but also the extent to which the targets of institutions have heterogeneous responses to them.

各国政府可借助双边投资协定（Bilateral Investment Treaties, BITs）这类国际承诺吸引外国直接投资（Foreign Direct Investment, FDI）的前提条件是什么？尽管已有诸多研究试图解答这一问题，但尚无研究探讨投资协定对不同行业的异质性影响。笔者主张，双边投资协定的效应在企业与政府间的过时议价问题最为突出时最为显著，亦即外国直接投资高度依赖政企间强约束力合约的场景。本文基于1985年至2011年间114个发展中国家的时序截面数据集开展实证分析，结果发现：双边投资协定与基础设施投资的增长显著相关——基础设施行业恰恰是高度依赖政府合约公信力的领域——但与外国直接投资总流入并无显著关联。此外，包含强力仲裁条款的双边投资协定对基础设施投资的统计效应最为显著，而未向投资者提供此类保护的协定则与投资增长无关。本研究结论既对政企与跨国企业间关系的相关学术研究具有启示意义，也为更广泛的国际制度研究提供了参考。为准确研判国际条约与制度的效应，学者们不仅应考察制度是否具有约束、引导作用，或是是否产生实质影响，还应关注制度的作用对象对其存在异质性响应的程度。