Replication Data for: Making Peace or Preventing It? UN Peacekeeping, Terrorism, and Civil War Negotiations

Previous studies have highlighted that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are effective at reducing violence during civil wars. But can these operations also change the incentives of the warring parties and lead them to pursue non-violent alternatives? This article provides the first direct test of UN peacekeeping troops’ effectiveness at inducing non-violent engagements, specifically negotiations during civil wars. Our analysis of disaggregated monthly data on peace operations, negotiations, and violence in African conflicts (1989–2009) reveals that sizable deployments of UN military troops, by themselves, are insufficient to foster negotiations, even when they reduce battlefield violence. Instead, the probability of negotiation instances is conditional on rebel tactics. We posit, when rebels engage in terrorism, peacekeeping troops can inadvertently alter the “power to hurt” of the belligerents in favor of rebel groups and create conditions conducive to negotiations. Our results have important implications for research on the effectiveness of both peacekeeping and terrorism and for policy-making.

过往研究已证实，联合国（United Nations，UN）维和行动在降低内战期间暴力水平方面成效显著。但此类行动能否同时改变交战方的行动动机，促使其转向非暴力解决方案？本文首次直接检验了联合国维和部队在推动非暴力接触——尤其是内战期间的谈判——方面的有效性。我们对1989年至2009年间非洲冲突中维和行动、谈判与暴力事件的细分月度数据展开分析后发现，仅依靠大规模部署联合国军事部队，即便能够降低战场暴力程度，也不足以推动谈判进程。谈判发生的概率实则取决于反叛组织的战术。我们提出如下理论假设：当反叛组织实施恐怖主义行为时，维和部队可能会在无意间重塑交战双方的“伤害能力”，转而有利于反叛团体，并创造出有利于谈判的条件。本研究结果对维和行动与恐怖主义相关研究领域，以及政策制定工作均具有重要的参考意义。