Playing Favorites: How Firms Prevent the Revelation of Bad News
收藏NBER2013-09-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w19429
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资源简介：
We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that cast their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience
我们探究了企业管控信息向市场传导的一种微妙却关键的机制。研究表明，那些在业绩电话会议中不成比例地邀请乐观分析师的企业，其未来业绩往往表现逊于市场平均水平。那些邀请更多持利好观点的分析师的企业则会
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2013-09-01
