Why Do Politicians Delegate?
收藏NBER2005-08-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w11531
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Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy tasks, though in general not those that would
机会主义政客以最大化连任概率与公职租金收益为目标。站在其自身视角，将政策决策权下放给独立官僚机构是否属于最优选择？答案是肯定的：政客们会下放部分政策任务，但通常而言不会下放那些本应……的政策
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2005-08-01
