Replication Data for: When Running for Office Runs in the Family: Horizontal Dynasties, Policy and Development in the Philippines

Political dynasties exist in practically every variant of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties---multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concurrently---affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who may oppose an incumbent's policy choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not lead to higher levels of economic development. We test this argument's implications in the Philippines. Employing a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of government spending, (ii) direct institutional constraints are the mechanism that drives this core result, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to economic growth or lower poverty.

政治家族（political dynasties）几乎遍布各类民主政体，但其具体形态因地域不同而有所差异。然而，学界尚未对政治家族的结构类型展开系统性探究。我们提出，横向政治家族（horizontal dynasties）——即同一政治家族的多名成员同时担任不同政治职务——会通过用家族内部成员替代潜在政治对手的方式影响政策制定：这些潜在对手可能会反对现任官员的政策选择。但在发展中国家，由政治家族身份带来的政策变动未必能推动更高水平的经济发展。我们以菲律宾为研究场景验证该理论的推论。通过对市长样本采用基于接近选举的断点回归设计（regression discontinuity design）分析，我们得到如下结论：(i) 横向政治家族背景的市长，其辖区的政府支出规模更高；(ii) 直接制度约束是催生这一核心结论的作用机制；(iii) 横向政治家族背景的市长并未推动辖区经济增长，也未降低贫困水平。