Replication data for: Diverting with Benevolent Military Force

Research on the diversionary use of force has burgeoned in recent years, but the literature remains divided. This paper attempts to reconcile extant findings by advancing a new theoretical framework for diversionary force centered on the agenda setting literature. It expands the conventional conception of diversionary behavior and distinguishes the benevolent use of force over low politics issues (which we term socio-economic intervention, SEI) from belligerent force used over high politics issues (which we term politico-strategic intervention, PSI). This expansion also refines our understanding of strategic conflict avoidance (SCA). Using Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression on 140 countries from 1950 to 1996, we find that democracies and mixed regimes tend to use SEI for diversion even though strategic conflict avoidance does not prevent them from using PSI. We further find that autocracies do not externalize their internal problems with either type of armed force and that, surprisingly, strategic conflict avoidance may constrain autocracies suffering economic decline. These outcomes suggest that our theory has utility and that research on both diversion and SCA would benefit from further theoretical refinement.

近年来，关于转移视线型武力使用（diversionary use of force）的研究蓬勃发展，但现有学术文献仍存在分歧。本文以议程设置研究（agenda setting literature）为核心，提出全新的转移视线型武力使用理论框架，以期调和既有研究的分歧。本文拓展了转移视线行为的传统认知，区分了两类武力使用场景：针对低政治议题的善意武力干预（本文称之为社会经济干预（Socio-economic Intervention, SEI）），以及针对高政治议题的对抗性武力干预（本文称之为政治战略干预（Politico-strategic Intervention, PSI））。这一拓展同时深化了我们对战略避战（Strategic Conflict Avoidance, SCA）的理解。本文基于1950年至1996年间140个国家的样本，采用零膨胀泊松（Zero-Inflated Poisson, ZIP）回归模型开展实证分析，结果显示：民主政体与混合政体倾向于通过社会经济干预实现转移视线的目的，即便战略避战并未阻止其使用政治战略干预。进一步研究发现，威权政体不会通过任何一类武装武力转嫁国内矛盾；且令人意外的是，战略避战反而会制约遭遇经济衰退的威权政体。上述结果验证了本文理论的有效性，同时表明转移视线型武力使用与战略避战领域的相关研究，均有待进一步的理论深化与完善。