Replication Data for: Jurisdictional Competition, Market Power, and the Compensation of Public Employees

Jurisdictional competition can encourage government efficiency but may also lead to collective action problems (e.g., bidding wars) that increase taxpayer costs. The net effect is particularly consequential for the cost of public employee compensation, which accounts for more than half of local government spending. Examining two decades of U.S. teacher salary data and changes in local teacher labor markets over time, I show that jurisdictional competition is associated with lower teacher salaries. One mechanism consistent with the evidence is that competitive markets help encourage lower spending through “yardstick competition.” The findings may help explain why government consolidations designed to promote economies of scale and efforts to take advantage of coordinated buying power do not always produce the expected savings.

辖区竞争（jurisdictional competition）虽可提升政府治理效率，但亦可能引发集体行动困境（如竞价大战），进而抬高纳税人的成本负担。其净效应对公职人员薪酬成本的影响尤为显著——而公职人员薪酬占地方政府财政支出的比重逾五成。本研究通过分析二十年间美国教师薪资数据与地方教师劳动力市场的长期变迁，证实辖区竞争与教师薪资水平偏低存在相关性。与实证证据相符的一项作用机制为：竞争型市场可通过“标尺竞争”（yardstick competition）助力压缩公共开支。本研究结论或可解释：为何旨在推动规模经济、依托协同采购权降本的政府合并举措，往往难以实现预期的成本节约。