Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?
收藏NBER1999-03-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w7004
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资源简介：
This paper characterizes the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side (i.e., the anticipation that the taxpayer will bailout lending banks if large default will occur) and sovereign risk on the borrower side. The impacts of such reserve
本文刻画了在贷方存在道德风险（moral hazard）（即预期若发生大规模违约，纳税人将救助放贷银行）且借方存在主权风险（sovereign risk）的情形下，法定存款准备金要求（reserve requirements）对金融贷款的影响。此类准备金的影响
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
1999-03-01
