Replication Data: Wage negotiations and strategic responses to transparency

This paper experimentally investigates how exogenous and endogenous wage transparency affect the interactions between employers and employees in a labor environment characterized by gift exchange. After the first part of the experiment in which wage offers always remain private information, three treatments in the second part either make wages fully transparent or leave the choice to establish (costly) wage transparency either to employees or employers. When full transparency is induced exogenously, the share of equal wage offers increases in the second part. At the same time, employers and employees rarely induce wage transparency themselves. Moreover, in the treatment where employees could enforce transparency, average wage offers and performance are significantly lower than in the other treatments. Results from a control treatment indicate that employees’ requests for wage information are cost-sensitive. If information about co-employees’ wage offers is costless, employees almost always ask for this information, thus achieving nearly full wage transparency. Further analyses reveal that wage offers in the second part seem to be higher under transparency than under non-transparency of wage offers.

本文通过实验探究了外源性与内源性工资透明度（wage transparency）在礼物交换型劳动环境中，对雇主与雇员间互动关系的影响。实验第一阶段中，工资报价始终属于私人信息；实验第二阶段共设置三类处理条件：一是外源性强制实现完全工资透明度，二是将设立（需承担成本的）工资透明度的选择权交由雇员，三是交由雇主。当外源性强制实施完全工资透明度时，第二阶段内均等工资报价的占比有所提升。与此同时，雇主与雇员极少主动自主创设工资透明度机制。此外，在雇员可强制实现工资透明度的处理条件中，平均工资报价与雇员绩效均显著低于其余处理条件。对照组实验结果显示，雇员对工资信息的查询请求具有成本敏感性。若查询同事工资报价的信息无需付出成本，雇员几乎都会主动索要该信息，进而实现近乎完全的工资透明度。进一步分析表明，第二阶段中，工资透明度环境下的工资报价要高于非透明度环境下的工资报价。