Constitutional Enforcement from Abroad: How Diaspora Economic Leverage Can Force Property Rights Reform in Captured States

This repository contains the data and replication code for "Constitutional Enforcement from Abroad: How Diaspora Economic Leverage Can Force Property Rights Reform in Captured States" by Paul LaTortue (Université de Notre Dame d'Haïti), David A. Skeel Jr. (University of Pennsylvania), and Scott Brown (University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras). CONTENTS: 1. IPRI- 2007 - 2025 data[25].xlsx - International Property Rights Index (IPRI) panel data (2007-2025) - 135 countries, 19 years - Physical Property Rights (PPR) scores (0-10 scale) - Source: International Property Rights Alliance (https://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/) - Used with permission from IPRI Director 2. DIASPORA.ipynb - Python code for complete analysis - Reproduces all figures and tables in the paper - Game theory modeling - Statistical analysis and visualizations - Runs in Google Colab or local Jupyter environment KEY FINDINGS:- Haiti ranks 134/135 globally in property rights (0.72/10)- Dominican Republic scores 6× higher (4.32/10) on same island- 79% decline in Haiti's property rights (2013-2025)- Game theory demonstrates $5.29B payoff differential favoring reforms- Diaspora remittances ($4.2B) exceed government budget ($2.5B) by 168% METHODOLOGY:The analysis uses IPRI panel data to document Haiti's property rights collapse, establishes the Dominican Republic as a natural counterfactual, models game-theoretic payoffs for diaspora remittance conditioning, and projects reform impacts. All visualizations are publication-quality (300 DPI) suitable for academic journals. REPLICATION:Complete replication instructions are provided in the README.md file. The code requires Python 3.8+ with standard data science libraries (pandas, numpy, matplotlib, seaborn). Runtime: approximately 30 seconds. CITATION:If you use this data or code, please cite:LaTortue, P., Skeel, D.A., & Brown, S. (2025). Constitutional Enforcement from Abroad: How Diaspora Economic Leverage Can Force Property Rights Reform in Captured States. [Manuscript submitted for publication]. Data citation:International Property Rights Alliance. (2025). International Property Rights Index 2025. Retrieved from https://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ LICENSE:Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)You are free to share and adapt this material with appropriate attribution. CONTACT:Scott Brown (Contact person)University of Puerto Rico at Río PiedrasEmail: [e-mail] This research advances "constitutional agency theory" - theorizing diaspora as creditor-principals who can enforce constitutional compliance through economic leverage when domestic institutions are captured. The findings have implications for 29 remittance-dependent countries globally, affecting over 500 million people.