Replication Data for: Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: The role of political institutions and state capacity

In recent decades, there has been an institutional shift in the literature on authoritarian regimes, with scholars investigating the role of political institutions, such as elections and political parties, in shaping regime stability and economic performance. However, scant attention has been devoted to the effect of political institutions on policy outcomes, and more specifically, on income inequality. This paper adds to this debate and sheds light on the role of formal and informal institutions, on the one hand, and state capacity, on the other, in influencing levels of income inequality in autocracies. We argue that, while the presence of elections and multiparty competition creates more favourable conditions for the adoption of redistributive policies, state capacity increases the likelihood of successfully implemented policy decisions aimed at reducing the level of inequality. Our empirical analysis rests on a time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes around 100 countries from 1972 to 2014. The findings indicate that both political institutions and a higher level of state capacity lead to lower levels of income inequality in authoritarian contexts.

近几十年来，威权政权研究领域的文献出现了制度转向，学者们开始探讨选举、政党等政治制度在塑造政权稳定性与经济表现中的作用。然而，现有研究对政治制度如何影响政策结果，尤其是收入不平等的效应关注甚少。本文补充了这一研究脉络，并阐释了正式与非正式制度，以及国家能力，分别对威权政体下收入不平等水平的影响机制。我们提出，尽管选举与多党竞争的存在为再分配政策的推行创造了更有利的条件，但国家能力的提升会增加旨在降低不平等水平的政策决策得以成功落地的概率。本文的实证分析基于1972年至2014年间覆盖约100个国家的时间序列横截面数据集（time-series cross-sectional dataset）。研究结果表明，在威权语境下，政治制度与更高水平的国家能力均会降低收入不平等程度。