Replication data for: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
收藏ICPSR2016-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
下载链接：
https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/113004
下载链接
链接失效反馈官方服务：
资源简介：
The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.
创建时间：
2016-01-01
