Winning the Game of Thrones: Leadership Succession in Modern Autocracies

Under what conditions can dictatorships manage peaceful leadership transitions? This article argues that constitutional succession rules are critical for modern dictatorships, contrary to the predominant scholarly focus on hereditary succession or parties. An effective succession rule needs to solve dual problems of peaceful exit and peaceful entry. First, the rule must enable incumbents to exit power peacefully by reducing coup threats. Second, the rule must empower the designated successor to ensure that they can enter power peacefully. Constitutional rules help solve both problems, and are particularly effective when they appoint the vice president as the designated successor. The vice president’s access to material resources deters other factions from challenging the succession procedure, whereas designating successors without a power base is ineffective. Using original data on constitutional rules in African autocracies, I show that regimes that formally designate the vice president as the successor are more likely to undergo peaceful transitions.

独裁政权在何种条件下能够实现和平的领导层更迭？本文提出，宪法继任规则对于现代独裁政权至关重要，这与学界主流聚焦世袭继任或政党继任的观点相悖。有效的继任规则需要解决和平卸任与和平掌权的双重难题：其一，该规则必须通过降低政变威胁，使在位者能够和平交出权力；其二，该规则必须赋予指定继任者权力，以确保其能够和平接掌政权。宪法规则有助于解决这两大难题，当其将副总统指定为继任者时尤为有效。副总统掌握的物质资源能够威慑其他派系挑战继任程序，而指定缺乏权力基础的继任者则收效甚微。借助非洲独裁政体宪法规则的原始数据集，本文证实，正式将副总统指定为继任者的政权，更有可能实现和平的领导层更迭。