Business cycles and earnings management strategies: a study in Brazilian public firms,

ABSTRACT This study contributes to the literature dealing with the influence of macroeconomic factors on accounting information quality, since it analyzes the earnings management strategies of firms, specifically identifying different discretionary behaviors among economic cycles: 1) different levels of earnings management through accruals between phases of the business cycle, and 2) the trade-off between earnings management through accruals and real earnings management. The results indicate that the accounting information reported should be analyzed with greater caution by its users, especially in periods of great economic oscillations, when managers can increase or reduce opportunistic behavior. The research population comprised non-financial companies with shares traded on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa) and the sample was composed of 247 firms per year, covering the period from 2000 to 2015 and totaling 2,501 observations. The phases of business cycles were used as a proxy for the economic environment and were based on Schumpeter's (1939) study, which divides an business cycle into four distinct phases: expansion, recession, contraction, and recovery. Discretionary accruals were estimated according to the Pae (2005) and Paulo (2007) models. Real earnings management was estimated as described by Roychowdhury (2006), using only the abnormal behavior of production costs and operational decisions. The results of this research show that earnings management strategies, using either accruals or real manipulation, as well as the choice between these strategies, are impacted by the economic environment. The evidence suggests that managers have different opportunistic behavior in each phase of the business cycle. Specifically, they increase the level of discretionary accruals in contractionary phases and reduce it during recoveries, while they manage earnings downwards via real manipulation in recessions and contractions.

摘要
本研究为探讨宏观经济因素对会计信息质量影响的相关学术文献贡献了新的研究内容，因本文分析了企业的盈余管理策略，具体识别了经济周期下的两类差异化可操纵行为：1）经济周期不同阶段中，基于应计项目的盈余管理水平存在差异；2）应计项目盈余管理与真实盈余管理（real earnings management）之间存在权衡关系。研究结果表明，会计信息使用者应当以更为审慎的态度分析所披露的会计信息，尤其是在经济剧烈波动时期——此时企业管理层的机会主义行为可能出现增减变动。

本研究的研究总体为在圣保罗证券、商品及期货交易所（BM&FBovespa）上市交易的非金融类企业，每年的样本包含247家企业，研究时段覆盖2000年至2015年，共计得到2501个观测值。本文以经济周期（business cycle）阶段作为经济环境的代理变量，该阶段划分基于熊彼特（1939）的研究成果，其将经济周期划分为四个独立阶段：扩张、衰退、收缩与复苏。

可操纵应计利润（discretionary accruals）的估计参考Pae（2005）与Paulo（2007）模型；真实盈余管理的估计则遵循Roychowdhury（2006）的方法，仅采用生产成本与经营决策的异常变动指标。本研究结果显示，无论是采用应计项目操纵还是真实操纵的盈余管理策略，抑或是两类策略之间的选择，均会受到经济环境的影响。研究证据表明，企业管理层在经济周期的不同阶段表现出差异化的机会主义行为：具体而言，在经济收缩阶段，管理层会提高可操纵应计利润的水平，而在经济复苏阶段则会降低该水平；同时在经济衰退与收缩阶段，管理层会通过真实操纵手段调低盈余水平。