Replication Data for: COUNTERINSURGENCY AS AN INSTITUTION: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put thirteen provinces under emergency rule (1987-2002). In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and electoral support for a pro-insurgent party. First, using first-differencing method, we show that the tenure of provinces under emergency rule contributes to the vote share of the pro- insurgent party. Second, we investigate which counterinsurgency policies worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to pro-insurgent vote. We find that detentions targeting activists shifted electoral preferences toward the pro-insurgent party, whereas population displacement and party identifications with emergency rule led to an opposite outcome. These results show that (1) legal-institutional framework of counterinsurgency affects civilians’ political perceptions in fundamental ways, and (2) it can lead to failure when its repressive arm targets activism. Overall, the paper presents an institutionalist account of civilian perceptions during wartime.

紧急区域是否为有效的反叛乱（counterinsurgency）措施？为应对库尔德叛乱，土耳其政府于1987年至2002年间将13个省份置于紧急统治状态。本文旨在探究紧急统治与叛乱支持政党（pro-insurgent party）的选举支持率之间的关联。其一，本文采用一阶差分法（first-differencing method）证实，处于紧急统治下的省份的存续时长会提升该叛乱支持政党的得票率。其二，本文进一步探究了哪些反叛乱政策作为传导机制，将紧急统治与叛乱支持政党的得票表现相联系。研究发现，针对活动人士的拘捕行动会使选民偏好转向该叛乱支持政党，而人口流离失所以及与紧急统治相关的政党认同则带来了截然相反的结果。上述研究结果表明：其一，反叛乱的法律与制度框架会从根本上影响平民的政治认知；其二，当反叛乱的镇压手段针对活动人士行动时，反而会导致举措失效。总体而言，本文为战时平民的政治认知提供了制度主义视角的阐释。