Eigenvalues and stability conditions for each EP.

In recent years, virtual reality training technology (VRTT) has been considered by many scholars as a new training method instead of traditional training (TT) to reduce unsafe behaviors ascribed to construction workers (CWs) and corporate accident rates. However, in this process, a conflict of interest arises among the government, construction enterprises (CEs), and CWs. Therefore, this study introduces a quantitative research method, the three-party evolutionary game and creatively combining them with the product life cycle (PLC) to solve this problem by analyzing the equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategies of the system. Finally, collaborative players’ decision-making behaviors and their sensitivity to critical factors are examined. This paper will illustrate these in each stage through numerical simulations. The results of the study indicate that the government plays a dominant role in the VRTT introduction stage. When the government gives CEs appropriate subsidies, CEs will eventually realize the importance of VRTT for CWs. Then the government will gradually reduce the amount of the subsidies in this process. In addition, we also find that the continually high cost will lead to negative policies by the government, which requires the active cooperation and attitude change from CEs and CWs. Ultimately, the government, CEs and CWs adopt the best strategy in the evolutionary process to facilitate the promotion, application and sustainability of VRTT in the construction industry.